Journal of Accountancy
Volume 36

Issue 4

Article 9

10-1923

Correspondence: “Proposed Taxation of Stock Dividends”;
Intercompany Profits
Walter J. Matherly
W. T. Sunley

Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jofa
Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Taxation Commons

Recommended Citation
Matherly, Walter J. and Sunley, W. T. (1923) "Correspondence: “Proposed Taxation of Stock Dividends”;
Intercompany Profits," Journal of Accountancy: Vol. 36: Iss. 4, Article 9.
Available at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jofa/vol36/iss4/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Archival Digital Accounting Collection at eGrove. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Accountancy by an authorized editor of eGrove. For more information,
please contact egrove@olemiss.edu.

Correspondence
“Proposed Taxation of Stock Dividends”
Editor, The Journal of Accountancy:
Sir: Mr. James Walton of Washington, D. C., has called my attention
to a slight inadvertence in the use of language in my article entitled
Proposed Taxation of Stock Dividends which appeared in the August issue
of The Journal of Accountancy. On page 100, there is found this
sentence: “But if he accepts the first, he can not deduct capital losses,
whereas if he accepts the second, he can deduct such losses.” The sentence
should read: “But if he accepts the first, he can not deduct net loss in
‘ordinary net income’ (that is, if instead of other income, he sustains a net
loss in business), whereas if he accepts the second, he can deduct such
loss.”
Yours truly,
Walter J. Matherly.
Chapel Hill, North Carolina, August 15, 1923.

Intercompany Profits
Editor, The Journal of Accountancy:
Sir: I have read the article by Mr. Carson on the Elimination of
Intercompany Profits in Consolidated Statements in the July Journal
with unusual interest, principally, no doubt, because it appears to have been
germinated by my article in the May issue.
In my article, I attempted to lead the proponents of the theory that
the total intercompany profits in inventories should be eliminated into a
position where they would admit that the minority’s share of such profits
should be recognized when the subsidiary was the selling company. Mr.
Carson apparently desired to lead them the remainder of the way and
insist that the minority’s proportion of such profits shall be recognized,
regardless of whether the selling company is the parent or the subsidiary.
The reasoning which he presents appears to me to be open to a number
of objections.
On pages 4 and 5 he presents an illustration in which the parent
company sells to the subsidiary, and he supports his contention that the
minority’s portion of the purchase should be taken into the consolidated
statement at the intercompany’s sales price in the following words:
“That the $1,000 of such profit, which the minority interest has
paid, is realized will become apparent if we assume a liquidation
of the subsidiary and a distribution of its assets in kind or if we
split the subsidiary up into two parts—80 per cent. and 20 per cent.
—and consolidate the former with the parent company.”
The first point that occurs to me ds of little importance, but might be
misinterpreted by some. As I understand it the minority interest has not
paid $1,000 profit; the subsidiary corporation has paid $15,000, which might
be divided up into different costs and profits. I do not wish to be under
stood as taking issue with Mr. Carson’s statement, because I do not infer
that he has made this a basis of his argument, but I do wish to make it

310

Correspondence
clear that the transfer of cash from the subsidiary to the parent does not
alter the status of the intercompany profits. There are two conditions
upon which Mr. Carson builds his argument:
1. If we assume a liquidation of the subsidiary and a distribution of
its assets in kind.
2. If we split the subsidiary up into two parts—80 per cent. and 20
per cent.—and consolidate the former with the parent company.
It was not clear to me at first whether the second condition was
distinct from or explanatory of the first condition. Upon further consid
eration the latter appealed to me as the more probable meaning, since the
obvious method of splitting the subsidiary up into its component parts is
to liquidate and distribute the assets.
To support his argument, then, Mr. Carson assumes “a liquidation of
the subsidiary and a distribution of its assets in kind.” All these questions
which we are discussing concerning consolidated statements are dependent
upon the existence of the relation of parent and subsidiary corporations.
If we assume the liquidation of the subsidiary, we assume the disappear
ance of this relation; and there is no consolidated statement and the basis
of all argument has been done away with. In other words, we cannot
predicate our reasoning upon the non-existence of that which is the first
premise of our argument.
The writer frankly admits that he has never seen a liquidation made
by distributing merchandise or real estate assets in kind; although he
almost handled such a distribution which was ultimately abandoned after
considerable bickering, because a basis for valuation could not be agreed
upon. Perhaps this experience has inspired an unfair distrust of the idea
in general. However, the gist of the matter seems to me to be this:
The accountants hold:
1. That profits are made only on sales.
2. That a sale must occur between at least two transacting parties.
3. That, looking behind the corporate existence, if two corporations
are controlled by the same interests, there is only one transacting
party in fact; and that sales upon which profits can be based cannot
arise from deals between two such corporations.
Then it appeals to me that if, following Mr. Carson’s assumption, “we
assume a liquidation of the subsidiary and a distribution of its assets in
kind,” the sale in fact occurs when the majority interests persuade the
minority stockholders to accept such a liquidation or, failing that, persuade
a court to uphold such a liquidation—and not before. In other words, the
sale of merchandise which cost $10,000 for $15,000, was handled by one
transacting party, the majority interests, and hence was not a sale for
the purpose of determining a profit from the accounting standpoint. The
price or the quantity might be manipulated to suit the purposes of that one
transacting party as it saw fit. For example, it might have sold the whole
of the parent company’s inventory to the subsidiary for $100,000. Would
it be proper to contend that by this transaction the parent company had
made a profit of $16,000—1/5 of ($100,000 — $20,000) ? If this were an
accepted method, an avenue for gross manipulation would be opened—an
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avenue which the accountants have tried to close. But if the minority
stockholders sanctioned the transfer of merchandise at a given valuation
(either by agreeing to the liquidation or in any other way) the matter
would assume a different aspect. At the time of such approval the real
sale is made—in respect to the minority—not when the merchandise is
transferred or the purchase recorded on the books.
I grant that the accountant must give due consideration to the interests
of preferred stockholders; but he must also give similar consideration to
the interests of the banker who has made loans to the corporation and the
interests of the manager who is working for a bonus share of the profits
and the interests of the common stockholders who have taken the major
load of the risk. It has been the writer’s experience that “conservatism”
is a wise policy for the accountant in safeguarding so many interests.
True, it may not satisfy some of the interested parties at the time, but
ultimately it gains him added respect, even from the dissatisfied persons.
But in this case it is not a matter simply of conservatism; it is a matter of
determining when a real sale is made, and, speaking from an accounting
standpoint, it appears that the sale is not made merely because the mer
chandise is transferred from one affiliated company to another at a price
set by the majority interests. The sale may occur in respect to the minority
interests in the purchasing company when they concur in the transaction.
In regard to the illustration used in Mr. Carson’s article, it is probable
that the preferred stockholders could insist from a legal standpoint that
the whole $5,000 profit in the sale was legally available as profits to the
parent company—not merely $1,000 of that profit. We must remember
that the legal and accounting viewpoints of holding companies are different;
the law looks upon these corporations as separate corporate entities;
accountancy looks upon them as one business separated into units by a
legal fiction. Mr. Finney in his book on Consolidated Statements states:
“For while it is true from a legal standpoint that the holding
company owns merely the stock, it is also true from a business
standpoint that the holding company virtually owns and actually
controls the subsidiary's net assets which the stock represents.
“In the second place, if we look past the legal fiction of separate
corporate entities and view the related companies as a single
organization, we find that no single balance-sheet shows the total
assets and liabilities of the organization, and the total stock of the
organization in the hands of the public.
“The consolidated balance-sheet is a device for avoiding these two
disadvantages of separate balance-sheets.”
And this brings me to a point that I wish to emphasize. In my article
in the May issue I spoke of accounting problems and my discussion has
been more or less influenced by this limitation to the idea of problems
presented by a written statement of facts rather than facts developed in
the course of actual work in practice. Such written statements of facts
are always much less complete as to attendant circumstances than the facts
developed during the course of an audit. These “problems” say: What
would you do if these were all the facts you had? And it is almost
humanly impossible to state every circumstance which might influence an
accountant’s attitude toward certain items. For example, I am informed
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that in preparing the consolidated balance-sheet of one large holding
company, certain intercompany profits in inventories are carried to the
balance-sheet without any reservation whatsoever. At first glance that
sounds like accounting heresy. But the attendant circumstances are these:
When a certain subsidiary is in the market for certain materials it sends
out bids to all manufacturers including several of its affiliated companies.
It buys from the lowest bidder regardless of whether that bidder is in
the combination or not. These bids are all on file ready for the account
ant’s inspection, so that he may know that the sale is in nowise influenced.
This leads us back to the purpose underlying the elimination of inter
company profits in inventory. The purpose is to prevent manipulation of
profits through affiliated companies. In practice this may be safeguarded
against in many ways. In handling accounting problems, the solver of the
problems demonstrates his knowledge of the existence of such a situation
by eliminating (or not eliminating) the profits in the most logical manner
consistent with the stated facts. Where the problem is silent as to
attendant circumstances, there is much to be said in favor of eliminating
all intercompany profits remaining in the inventories. It seems to the
writer, however, more sound to eliminate all of the profits only when
those profits are in the parent company’s surplus. In addition to the
reasons set forth in my article, the following reasoning appears to support
this plan of procedure where no attendant circumstances are stated:
1. If the sale is made by the parent company to the subsidiary, the
adding of an exorbitant profit will work to the advantage of the
majority holdings and to the disadvantage of the minority holdings.
2. If the sale is made by the subsidiary to the parent company, the
adding of an exorbitant profit will work to the disadvantage of the
majority and to the advantage of the minority.
Since the majority is in control there is less likelihood of an exorbitant
profit being added when the sale is made by the subsidiary to the parent;
but if the profits are being manipulated it is likely to occur when the sale
is made by the parent to the subsidiary. It is the writer’s contention that
the accounting student might indicate his knowledge of this difference by
eliminating all of the profits in inventory when the parent sells to the
subsidiary, and by eliminating only the majority’s share of such profits
when the subsidiary sells to the parent.
In actual practice, the accountant will, of course, guide his actions by
the attendant circumstances which cannot (or, at least, usually are not)
given in a stated accounting problem.
Yours very truly,
W. T. SUNLEY.

Chicago, July 9, 1923.

The governor of Massachusetts has appointed the following mem
bers of the board for the registration of certified public accountants
authorized under the amended C. P. A. law of that state: Edwin L. Pride,
chairman; Daniel B. Lewis, secretary; George L. Bishop, Patrick F.
Crowley and James F. Fox.
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